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Lease contracts provide a promising format for capturing the
potential efficiency gains of private participation in the water
supply sector. But to ensure that these gains accrue to society as
a whole, lease contracts must be carefully designed and the
responsible public authority must be capable of fulfilling the
monitoring and regulatory role effectively.
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In 1989 the Republic of Guinea restructured its  The strength of the lease-contract arrange-
urban water supply sector and entered into a  ment in Guinea lies in the simplicity of the
lease-contract arrangement in which private  institutional framework, the specificity of
interests participate in delivering services.  responsibilities, and the clarity of accountability
relationships and incentives.  In planning invest-
Ownership of the country's urban water  ments and setting tariffs, SONEG has an incen-
supply facilities and responsibility for sector  tive to maintain the financial viability of the
planning and investment were transferred to a  operations on which it depends for revenue.
new national water authority, SONEG. A new  SEEG is motivated to increase profits by operat-
water management company (SEEG) was  ing efficiently and to avoid financial penalties by
crcated as a mixed enterprise by the government  meeting service standards.
(49 percent) and a private foreign investor-
manager (51 percent) to operate and maintain the  The challenges lie in the difficulty of creat-
facilities.  ing in SONEG a strong oversight agency that
will be able to negotiate effectively with SEEG
If carefully designed, a lease-contract  and in the difficulty of attractng  competition for
arrangement can transfer maximum commercial  subsequent contracts. Unless SONEG is suc-
risk to the contractor for day-to-day operations.  cessful, consumers may not capture many of the
But unlike a concession, it does not transfer  potential efficiency gains of private participation.
ownership or the burden of capital expenditures
for major new irnvestments.  Processing the IDA credit for this arrange-
ment was delayed because World Bank procure-
Recent experience with lease contracts and  ment guidelines do not covcr the selection of
concessions in C6te d lvoire demonstrated that  contractors for lease contracts or concessions.
fragmentation of responsibilities for planning,  With the growing interest in private operation of
investment, operations, maintenance, and debt  public services, the Bank should consider
service may lead to inefficiency and lack of  developing appropriate guidelines for selecting
accountability. And revenue protection clauses  contractors for lease contracts and concessions.
may erode incentives for efficiency.
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1.  An enduring feature of virtually every evaluation of water supply and sanitation
operations in World Bank borrower countries is that sector institutions are relatively
ineffective.  The catalogue of deficiencies is extensive:  unaccounted-for water, inadequate
maintenance, low sales, low productivity of staff, low collection ratio, and often an
unsustainable financial position.  Approaches that are suggested to  deal with these deficiencies
are the introduction of market-like incentives in publicly owned and operated services, and the
introduction of private sector ownership, management, and operation of sector services.  There
are precedents for the adoption of such approaches in several developed countries and in a
few developing countries.  In a number of cases, private firms have played a role in the sector
for many years.  Now that the popularity of these approaches to reform is growing, the need
for guidelines for preparing and implementing them is obvicus.  Since we know of no
systematic examination of the effectiveness of privatization and market surrogate schemes or of
the factors that contribute to their effectiveness in this sector in developing countries, a
strategy is needed for applied research that would serve as a basis of guidelines.
2.  It is essential, first, to examine the theoretical basis of arguments for
introducing market mechanisms and private sector involvement in water supply and sanitation
and to  understand the practical implications of the theory for sector policies and institutional
arrangements.  On this basis, research should be aimed at evaluating the effectiveness of
various institutional arrangements in different countries, observing the barriers to implementing
reforms of this nature in the sector, and identifying  various ways of addressing the barriers.
3.  Water supply and sanitation operations are frequently considered public goods,
and they may also be natural monopolies.  They are not widely supplied in free markets.  It  is
often assumed that these services should be provided by governments, but this is not
necessarily so; given an appropriate framework, the private sector may be willing in many
situations to deliver services, and it can do so more efficiently than the public sector.  Yet
involvement of the private sector does not  automatically  lead to economic efficiency,  from the
point of view of society as a whole.  Our approach to  this issue is first to seek a balance
between public and private roles by identifying  the minimum  responsibilities  the government
should assume (to ensure that these public goods are supplied and broadly consumed at near
optimal levels) and the sector functions that could be carried out effectively by the private
sector.  Second, it is essential to explore ways in which the characteristics and mechanisms of
free markets that are associated with efficiency  can be introduced into sector operations.  For
example, since competition is usually considered the most essential characteristic of an efficient
market, we are interested in determining how competition can be introduced into sector
operations.  Which institutional and legal arrangements can be used to ensure that
privatization actually improves efficiency?  When privatization is not  feasible or when a market
is not contestable, what market surrogate mechanisms can be used to  create incentives for
efficiency, rational investment planning, and adequate maintenance?
4.  The implications of institutional arrangements for private and public sector
capacity (that is, the ability of each actor to carry out its assigned role) should be  examined.
In specific countries, the comparative strengths of the private and public sectors and their
incentives to perform effectively,  as well as the official attitude toward the private sector, must
be considered.  One of the arguments for introducing private involvement in the delivery of
services is that it can relieve weak public institutions of the burden of day-to-day operations sothat they can concentrate on the tasks of sector policy making, planning, and regulation.  At
the same time, these arrangements create the need for an oversight agency.  It is thereforc
useful to scrutinize arrangements for private participation to determine what capacity
requirements are implied for public oversight agencies and whether some are institutionally  less
burdensome than others.  Since the strength of the public sector and its ability to  adapt to
changing circumstances  vary considerably from one developing country to  another, the choice
of arrangement will depend greatly on local conditions.
5.  A related factor to consider is the extent to which local capacity, in both the
public and private sectors, can be expected to develop under a particular arrangement.  Some
arrangements may foster local capacity building more than others.  Many will require the
participation of expatriates.  In our eagerness to improve efficiency and extend coverege in the
water and sanitation sector, we should not forget that true development involves the
enhancement of local capacity, particularly for routine functions associated with day-to-day
service delivery.  There may be a price to pay in terms of short-term efficiency while local
capacity is being developed, but the long-term benefits can more than justify the short-run
costs.  Strategies for ensuring that this occurs need to be cultivated.
6.  Other questions to be researched concern regulatory and incentive frameworks.
To what extent do local labor laws, tax regirr, s, import restrictions, and banking and foreign
exchange restrictions inhibit private sector r  Aticipation? If the overall incentive environment
is distorted and broad-based reform is not  easible in the short term, but if the government
nevertheless wants to initiate private sector participation, can appropriate exemptions and
guarantees be incorporated into contracts for private delivery of service?  Can such piecemeal
reforms be effectively integrated with broader-based reforms in the long term?
7.  Finally, policies and mechanisms for cost recovery and, in particular, for
implementing  distributional objectives in the context of commercial operations should be
investigated.  Which payment terms and mechanisms  best promote efficiency?  For example,
payments that are based on performance (cubic meters of water provided, tons of waste
collected, etc.) are more effective than nonvariable fees.  How can an operator's legitimate
need for reliability  of income be satisfied?  What arrangements for adjusting the operator's
rate and changing tariffs are consistent with efficiency? If the full cost of services is not
re,.overed through tariffs, how can the shortfall be provided?  Does cross-subsidization
undermine financial viability?
8.  This study represents an initial effort in what we hope will become a significant
research project on privatization and the introduction cf commercial principles and mechanisms
into the water supp!y and sanitation sector.  It establishes what the major issues are and
demonstrates these through a case study.  After summarizing  past experience with a similar
arrangement in C6te d'Ivoire, the study examines in detail tne case of private involvement
through a lease contract for water supply operations in the Republic of Guinea.  Since
operations under the new arrangement in Guinea have been under way for only a few mnnths,
this study is not an evaluation of results.  Rather, the case is used as a vehicle for exploring
many of the theoretical and practical considerations outlined above.  The lease-contract
arrangement presents an interesting case because it involves  participation of the private sector
in commercial ser ice delivery, while ownership of facilities and responsibility  for sector
planning and investment are retained by the public sector.  It provides an opportunity forexploring the balance between public  -nd private roles, and mechanisms for promoting
effective performance in the sector as a whole.
9.  Future  research should describe practical applications of other types of
arrangements, and ultimately evaluate and compare the results of schemes that have been in
operation for several years in different settings.  {
Curt Carnemark, Chief
Water and Sanitation Division  \1.  Introduction
1.1  The Republic of Guinea has recently taken steps to  restructure dramatically the
urban water supply sector and to rehabilitate operations and improve financial performance.
The Intemational Development Association (IDA), the World Bank affiliate that lends on
concessional terms to the poorest countries, is supporting these reforms through a Second
Water Supply Project (Credit 1985-GUI) that became effective on October 5, 1989.1 A new
state enterprise, Soci&t6  Nationale des Eaux de Guin6e (SONEG), now owns the urban water
supply facilities and has entered  into a lease contract with a new water management company,
Soci&t6  d'Exploitation  des Eaux de Guin6e (SEEG), for the operation and maintenance of the
urban water supply systems. 2 SEEG, which is expected to function as a commercial enterprise
with complete autonomy in the exercise of day-to-day  operational decisions,  will retain an
agreed portion of the tariff it collects from customers (the lease-contractor rate) and will
submit the remainder to SONEG as rent.
1.2  The government has agreed to raise tariffs gradually to a level that will cover
sectoral operating expenses, including depreciation, and yield an acceptable financial return on
system assets and the lease contractor's equity.  During an intecim period, the lease-cuntractor
rate will be supplemented on a declining basis by the IDA credit; allocations from the
National Budget will cover part of SONEG's debt service, also on a declining basis.  In
addition, the IDA credit will contribute to the rehabilitation of existing facilities, the expansion
of the Conakry water supply system, and consultancy services for SONEG.  The African
Development Bank, the French Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Economique (CCCE), and the
European Investment Bank are co-financing  the expansion investments.
1.3  This paper will outline the theoretical arguments that are relevant to  the
project design, describe the institutional arrangements that were adc  'ed,  examine the key
provisions of the legal documents, and explain how the major issues . at arose during project
preparation were addressed.  Part 2 presents, as background, general economic theory
regarding the roles of the public and private sectors in providing public services. In Part 3,
the main features and advantages of lease contracts are discussed, and the experience in CMte
d'Ivoire with lease contracts and concessions for water supply is summarized. The recent
history of the water supply sector in Guinea is outlined in Part 4.  Part 5 discusses key
features of the new institutional and financial arrangements.  Particular attention is devoted to
the lease contractor selection process, the role of IDA funding, key provisions of the legal
documents, and the resolution of uncertainties regarding the application of World Bank Group
procurement policies to this case.  Conclusions are preser-ed in Part 6.
1.4  Although this type of arrangement has been used successfully  in both Europe
and Africa, the project under examination is still in the very early stages of execution, and it
will be several years before the design can be evaluated in light of actual experience.  It  is the
first case in which the World Bank has financed a lease contract as a package.  With this in
1.  This study  is based in part on the Staff Appraisal  Report for the IDA credit prepared  by
Alain Locussol  and Richard  Verspyck  (Report 7304-GUI).
2.  SEEG is a mixed  enterprise  owned  by the Republic  of Guinea  (49 percent) and a consortium  of
French firms (51 percen).2
mind, it is hoped that the paper will not only he!p Bank Group managers and staff who are
contemplating the preparation of similar projects, but also stimulate further research on the
participation of the private sector in public service projects and contribute to  the evolution of
the Bank's policics in this area, particularly the procurement and selection process.
2.  Economic Theory:  Balancing Public and  Private Roles  in 'Water Supply
2.1  Until very recentiy, discussions  of the relative merits of the public sector and
the private sector have been cast in terms of ideology, with the discussants at opposite poles.
Although ideology and scclal values will continue to be an important component of the
di.cussion, there is growing recognition that neither the public sector nor the private sector
always operates efficiently or in the best interest of society.  Any society that wishes to
minimize inefficiency  and injustice should take advantage of the relative strengths of the public
and private sectors (as well as community  organizations and informal businesses) and enable
each to perform the useful roles for which it is best suited in that particular environment.
Since the definitions of efficiency and justice vary from one society to another, and from one
time to  another, and the relative strengths of the public and private sectors vary as well, there
are no formulas that can be easily applied to all countries.  Nevertheless, relying on economic
theory, it is possible to make some statements about the relative roles of the public and
private sectors that are generally applicable to most societies.  To do so requires an
understanding of what economists mean by public and private goods.
Public and Private Goods
2.2  According to economic theory, goods and services can be distinguished by
whether they are consumed individually  or jointly, and by whether nonpayers can be excluded
or not.  In fact, all goods fall somewhere along the continuum between individual  and joint
consumption and along the other continuum between feasible and infeasible exclusion. 3
Private goods are consumed individually: once consumed by one individual,  they are not
availablc for consumption by another, nor would the benefits of consumption accrue to anyone
else.  Moreover, the individual  consumers are identifiable and nonpayers can be excluded from
consumption.  Private goods are usually available only by paying the market price, and private
firms are willing to  produce and market such goods only if they can cover the;r costs and
make a profit at the market price.  Most of the ordinary goods and services that are bought
by consumers in the marketplace (for example, food, clothing, furniture, automobiles, and
cleaning services) can be considered private goods.
2.3  At the opposite extreme are public goods that are typified by Joint consumption
and infeasible exclusion.  These are available to everyone, and the benefits of their availability
accrue to the community as a whole.  When one individual benefits from a public good, its
availabiiity  to others  is not dimirnished,  and it is practically impossible to charge individuals for
its use or to exclude nonpayers.  Public health, environmental control, police protection and
national defense are usually considered public goods.  Because of the difficulty  of identifying
the extent to which each individual  benefits from such goods, and of charging each individual
accordingly,  the private sector tends to  produce less than the socially desirablk levels of these
3.  This discussion  of public  and private  goods  is b sed on E. S. Savas,  Privatizing  the Public Sector:
How to Shrink Government  (Chatham,  N.J.: Chatham  House Publishers,  1982),  pp. 30-33.3
goods.  Ensuring that these goods and services are provided at appropriate levels is therelore
considered the responsibility  of government.
2.4  There are, in fact, no "pure" private goods or public goods.  All private goods
entail some positive and/or negative externalities (costs or benefits that affect someone othcr
than the primary consumer like, for example, pollution result:--  from the consumption of
fuels).  All public goods have some characteristics of private goods, some more than others.
Goods and services that  are subject to individual  consumption, but for which it is not possible
or practical to  identify consumers and charge a fee, are known as common  pool goods.  These
include natural resources like the air, wilderness areas, rivers, and oceans.  Some governmcnt
regulation is usually rnecessary  to  ensure that the commons are used efficiently and equitably.
Otherwise the commons would be subject to overuse and exhaustion.
2.5  Toll goods are another category.  Although fees can be charged and nonpaycrs
excluded, toll goods are not subject to  individual  consumption, (that is, the benefits of
consumption accrue to society as a whole, and consumption of a toll good by one  individual
does not usually reduce its availability  ;o others).  In fact, the efficacy of some services may
increase in proportion to the number of users.  Radio and TV broadcasts and, to  some extcnt,
telephone service are examples.  Some toll gcods (for example, bridges and mass transit
systems) are also natural  monopolies;  the fixed costs of their production are much higher thaln
the variable costs, and production is subject to important economies of scale.  A natural
monopoly may present two possible dangers.  First, the high costs and risks may discourage
private production altogether.  Second, if a private producer does emerge, it is not likely to
face direct competition and is therefore able to charge more than the costs of ownership and
operation of the facilities, and consumers have no alternative source of supply if the service is
poor.  Public involvement is required for several reasons:  to allocate monopoly rights to a
private party that is willing to  make the investment, to  regulate prices in the public interest,
and to establish and monitor performance standards.  In some situations, where the private
sector cannot raise the necessary capital, it may be desirable for the government to undertake
the investments.
2.6  The purer private goods and services require the least government intervention.
though the establishment of standards and regi  .tions to ensure safety, transparency and
honesty may be desirable.  The more a good f,r  service exhibits one of the characteristics of a
public good (that is, collective consumption enhances efficiency,  or charging users is
;-npractical),  the more government involvement may be justified.  But even for most of these
goods and services, public ownership of direct production is not required; rather, some form of
government intervention to organize or regulate private sector activities may be adequate.
Even if production is subject to  important economies of scale, awarding franchises and
regulation of prices may be  adequate to ensure optimal production and consumption.  The
almost pure public goods and services, like police protection or environmental regulation, are
most likely to require direct government production or provision.
Comparative Strengths of the Public and Private Sectors
2.7  The strength of the private sector is that it is usually able to  deliver marketablc
services and products more efficiently than the public sector.  Although efficient public4
enterprises do exist, private firms seem to be  more efficient in the majority of cascs. 4 In
general, efficiency in the operation of commercial activities is associated with the existence of
competition.  In a competitive market, a producer's rcvenues are linked with costs through the
price mechanism. By improving efficiency  the producer can reduce prices and, in doing so,
increase sales and revenues.  Failure to do so often results in bankruptcy.  In public
enterprises that do not operate in competitive markets, the link between revenues (or rewards)
and cost control (efficiency)  is often weak or absent altogether.  Efforts to improve the
performance of public enterprises often involve the strengthening of this link through the
introduction of commercial  accounting practices, the elimination of budgetary subsidies, and the
introduction of incentive pay scheme-s  or direct competition in the market (by allowing private
firms to exist and compete with public firmns).
2.8  The public sector's arca of corrmparative  advantage lies in carrying out  those
activities that the private sector cannot perfoim and in stimulating private interest in
economically  desirable activities that otherwise would not be undertaken.  In generai, this
includes correcting for externalities, protecting common pool resources, and organizing or
regulating natural monopolies.  These are difficult and complex tasks; creating and sustaining a
capacity to carry them out constitutes a major ch.Ilenge for both developed and developing
countries.
2.9  The division of labor and specializationi  between the private and public sectors
will vary from country to country depending not only on the economic situation and level of
development, but also on cultural and socioeconomic factors.  Occasionally,  community
organizations or the informal sector may be able to  rill  a need that the more formal sectors
cannot.  In the water ar.d sanitation sector, for example, they may provide water to  households
without central connections and engage in solid waste collection and recvcling. With minimal
public support or recognition, and liaison with formal public programs, these less formal agents
can make a valuable contribution.  In most instances, the choice is not  an either-or
proposition, but a question of balancing the roles of the various actors.  Since the capacity of
both the public and private sectors is severely limited in many developing countries, it is even
more essential that the strengths and resources of all actors be used effectively.
The Water Supply Sector
2.10  Water supply has a key characteristic that makes it a potentially viable
commercial enterprise for the private sector:  it is feasible (in the context of appropriate legal,
institutional, and technical conditions) to charge users of the service and to exclude nonpayers.
But water supply also involves significant  externalities i:  ie form of health and productivity
benefits for the economy as a whole.  Since some individuals may not be aware of the benefits
or may not be willing or able to pay, an optimal level of waLer  supply services might not  be
produced or consumed without some public intervention to subsidize or provide for cross-
subsidization through differential block rates.
2.11  In addition, water supply has the characteristics  of a natural monopoly:  the
infrastructure required for water supply has very high investment costs and is subject so
4.  Elliot Berg Associates. "Private  Provision  of Public  Services: A Literature Review"  (paper
prepared  for the Public  Sector Management  and Private  Sector  Development  Division,  Country
Economics  Department  of the World  Bank, April 1989),  p. 13.5
important econonmies  of scale; and competing systems are impractical in most cases.  Some
government involvement is needed to allocate monopoly rights, regulate prices, monitor
perfotmance, and in some situations make the most costly investments.  However, it does not
follow that public operation is essential, or even desirable.
2.12  Though day-to-day  competition in the marketplace is not practical, it may be
possible to introduce incentives for efficiency through competitive bidding for concessions or
r,ontracts to operate services.  In theory, as long as competition is fair, it should not matter
whether the competing firms are publicly owned or private.  But in developing countries where
public administrations are not  particularly strong, it may be advisable for the public sector to
concentrate on those aspects of water supply that are not appropriate for the private sector
(that is, oversight and regulatory functions), and to contract with private firms for the day-to-
day commercial operation of systems and, if possible, for the planning, financing, and
implementation of investments.  In situations where no viable competitors to an incumbent
operator exist, the government may take steps to foster the development of competitors.
2.13  Finally, it is worth emphasizing  that regulating and monitoring a natural
moncpoly are complex and diffictilt responsibilities. The oversight agency must establish
financial and technical standards, design a selection pro 2ss, choose the operator, monitor and
evaluate the operator's performance, and periodically  renegotiate contracts and revise
standards.  Good regulation requires not only technical skills, but also high ethical standards,
consistent political support, and a minimum  of political interference. 5 Moreover, it is harder
to creat-, incentives for effectiveness in regulatory agencies than it is in commercial ones, and
the failure of a regulatory agency to function effectively can undermine the potential benerits
_; competitive contracting for the operation of a publir service.
3.  Institutional  Arrangements for  Private Participation  in Water Supply
3.1  Daniel Coyaud has described four types of contractual arrangements through
which the private sector participates in water supply:  service contracts, management contracts,
lease contracts, and concessions. 6 Under service contracts and management contracts, a public
entity contracts with a private firm for the provision of specific services.  A service contract is
fairly limited in scope and covers a specific activity such as training or equipment maintenance;
a management contract uisually  covers the full range of operations.  The two are similar,
however, in that a public authority bears the full commercial risk under both, and Lhe
compensation of the contractor is usually not directly linked to operational efficiency or cost
control.  Conventional technical assistance contracts usually fall into the service contract
category.  In contrast, under lease contracts and concessions, commercial risks are shifted to
the contractor.  Under a lease contract, a private firm rents facilities from the public authority,
which remains responsible for investments.  The lessee finances only working capital for
operation and maintenance.  A concessionaire must finance investments as well as working
capital. (A more detailed summary description of the four arrangements is provided in
Annex 1.)
5.  Arturo Israel,  "The  Changing  Rcwe  of the State: Institutional  Dimensions,"  draft paper,  1989,  pp. 17-18.
6.  Dasiiel  P. Coyaud,  Prvate and Public  Alternatives  for Providing  Water Supply and Sewerage  Services,
World  Bank Infrastructure  and Urban Development  Papers,  Report INU 31.  1988.6
Advantages  of  Lease  Contracts  and  Concessions
3.2  Arrangements  in which  the  contractor  assumes the  commercial  risks offer  the
advantage  that  the  contractor  is motivated  to  improve  the  efficiency  of the  system.  Therefore,
lease  contracts  and  concessions  are  more  likely to  lead  to  the  "least-cost  output"  (for  example,
per  cubic  metcr  of  water)  than  are  service or  management  contracts  in which  the  contractor's
compensation  is not  linked  to  revenues.  Since  the  lease-contractor  rate  (LCR),  or  the
concession  rate,  is usually calculated  as a  portion  of  revenues  per  unit,  reductions  in  unit costs
and  ali improved  collection  ratio  mean  increased  profits.  Although  part  of these  benefits
might  accrue  to society when  the  LCR  or  concession  rate  is eventually  adjusted  or
renegotiated,  the  prospect  of  losing some  of the  hard-won  profits  per  unit  supplied  would  not
necessarily  reduc'-  the  contractor's  incentive,  since  efficiency  improvements  would  also  give the
firm  a strong  position  in competing  for  contract  renewal.  In  addition,  if services  were  growing
to  meet  unsatisfied  demand,  or  if demand  were  expanding,  total  profits  might  increase  even
thc. gh  piofits  per  unit decreased.  Depending  on  how elastic  demand  is, the  lower  tariff  could
also  result  in  an  increase  in quantity  used, which  would offset  the  reduction  in  unit  profits.7
3.3  Concessions  may be  preferable  to  lease  contracts  because  there  are  some
obvious  advantages  to  assigning respons.i ility for  investments  to  a  commercial  entity  that  is
also responsible  for  operations.  The  operator  is well  placed  to  forecast  demand  and  make
investment  decisions  that  will satisfy demand  in  a commercially viable  fashion.  Inappropriate
investments  often  result  when  decisions  are  made  in  isolation  from commercial  considerations.
In  addition,  the  owner  of physical assets  has  a  stronger  incentive  to  maintain  them  than  does  a
lessee.  Ilowever,  concession  arrangements  are  not  always feasible.  If the  cost  of an
investment  exceeds  the  borrowing  capacity of  the  private  sector,  or  if  the  political  and
economic  situation  makes the  private  sector  reluctant  to  invest,  the  public  sector  might  have  to
assume  responsibility  for  planning  and  investment.  In such  cases, a  lease  contract  is the
appropriate  commercial  arrangement,  but  mechanisms  should  be  incorporated  into  the  lease
contract  to ensure  that  adequate  maintenance  will be carried  out.  Once  most  of  the  costly
investments  have  been  completed,  or the  political and  economic  situation  has  improved,  it may
be  possible to  convert  a  lease  contract  into  a concession  under  which  the  private  company
makes limited  future  investments  and  pays a  rental  fee  on  completed  investments.
3.4  Lease  contracts  allow for  the  involvement  of professional  private  companies  in
the  technical  and  commercial  operations  of public services.  These  have  a  built-in  incentive  to
improve  efficiency, but  without  the  burden  of  capital  expenditures.  Such  arrangements  are
widely used  in  France  for  water  supply, sanitation,  and  solid waste  management  services, and
they  have  been  used  for  the  delivery  of various  public  services  in West  Africa.  In  CMte
d'lvoire,  the  urban  water  sector  has  been  operated  by a  private  company, Societet de
Distribution d'Eau  de  C6te d'lvoire  (SODECI),  during  the  past  twenty-five years  under  a  mix of
7.  Price elasticity is an economic concept that is used to indicate the change in quantity demanded
that results from a change in price.  it is represented mathematically  as the ratio of the percentagc
change in quantity demanded to  the percentage change in price.  If the percentage change in quantity
demanded is greater than the percentage change in price, (that is, if price elasticity is less than -1),
then demand is said to be elastic.  But if the percentage change in quantity is equal to or less than
the percentage change in price, (that is, price elasticity is greater than or equal to -1), then demand is
said to be inelastic.7
concessions and lease contracts.  Lease contracts are also being used in Niger (road
transportation), Nigeria (port management), Central African Republic (river transportation),
and Guinea (mining operations).
3.5  In each of the West African examples mentioned above, the contracted firm is
a joint foreign-local enterprise.  SODECI is a private company of which 48 percent of the
stock is owned by French interests and 52 percent by Ivorian stockholders, including 4 percent
held by the National Financing Bank.  The other arrangements involve mixed enterprises that
are jointly owned by the state and a foreign private partner.  In all these cases, the foreign
partner has brought to  the arrangement essential technical and managerial expertise.  Such an
arrangement constitutes an alternative to conventional technical assistance contracts.  It
incorporates an important advantage:  because of the built-in incentive to reduce costs, the
operating firm is more motivated to use local staff and develop local capacities, so expensive
expatriate staff can eventually be reduced.  In C6te d'Ivoire, SODECI has reduced the number
of expatriate staff from 40 to  12 over a period of 25 years, during which operations have been
expanding.  Currently, the general manager and all provincial  managers are Ivorian.
3.6  Though it is not always possible initially,  there are advantages to transferring
the locally owned portion of joint enterprises to  the local private sector.  In so doing, the
state retains its regulatory role but  avails itself of the resources and greater efficiency of the
private sector.
The Relevant Experience in C6te d'Ivoire
3.7  Although the experience in C6te d'Ivoire with SODECI has been successful as
regards urban water supply operations, the overall arrangement encompassing urban sanitation
and rural water supply has produced mixed results.  It is worth reviewing this experience and
noting the lessons that have been learned. 8
3.8  Institutional Arrangements and SODECI's Role.  Following a successful
competitive bid, SODECI was established in 1960 as a subsidiary  of Soci&t6  d'Am6nagement
Urbain  et Rural (SAUR), a large French water utility, to operate  the Abidjan water supply
system under a concession contract.  Subsequently,  the majority of the company's equity was
acquired by private Ivorian shareholders; stocks have been traded on the Abidjan Stock
Exchange since 1978.  In  1974, the legal arrangements between the government and SODECI
were expanded to include (i) a lease contract for operation and maintenance of all urban and
rural water supply facilities outside the capital, Abidjan; (ii) a concession contract for the
Abidjan water supply system under which SODECI, in addition to operation and maintenance,
was responsible for investments in boreholes; and (iii) a conventional maintenance contract for
the Abidjan sewerage and drainage system.  SODECI collected the approved tariff from
consumers and, after subtracting its lease contractor and concession fees, transferred the
remaining proceeds to two sector funds, the National Water Works Fund (FNH), which was
responsible for water sector debt service, and the National Sanitation Fund (FNA), which
financed the sanitation sector.  The Water Directorate of the Ministry of Public Works and
Transportation was responsible for planning and investment.
8.  This review  is based on the President's  Report for a Water Supply  and Sanitation  Sector
Adjustment  Loan to the Republic  of CMte  d'lvoire,  Report P-5089-RCI.  The World Bank, 1990.8
3.9  Although SODECI was not consulted regarding these investments, it was
obliged under the terms of its contract to operate and maintain all new water supply systems.
Since the contract also provided that SODECI would be compensated for any shortfall
between actual and projected sales, SODECI did not really assume all of the commercial risk.
This arrangement continued until 1987, when the gevernment began to restructure the water
and sanitation sector.
3.10  Results.  By 1989, water supply was accessible to the majority of Ivorians.  A
total of 158 cities and towns and about 90 villages were equipped with piped systems; 72
percent of the urban population (87 percent in Abidjan and 60 percent in other urban
centers) had access to safe water, compared with less than 30 percent in 1974.  In more than
8,000 villages, 13,500  water points had been constructed and equipped with handpumps.  If all
of these had been in working order, the coverage ratio would have been above 80 percen 4 in
rural areas (compared with less than  10 percent in 1974), but  a large proportion of these
water points were not in working condition.
3.11  In the urban areas, operating efficiency  was excellent, with a low level of
unaccounted-for water (12 percent) and a high collection rate  (98 percent) for private
customers.  The company's productivity  was twice as high as that of any other water utility in
West Africa, either  in physical terms (130 connections per employee) or monetary terms (value
added divided by personnel costs).  In the rural areas, performance was poor.  A centralized
maintenance system resulted in costly and delayed repairs; community development initiatives
were not well organized, and villager participation was weak.  Supervision of SODECI by the
Water Directorate was inadequate, and cost recovery policies have been erratic.
3.12  Overall financial and economic performance of the water sector was undermined
by the 'ack of coordination, inadequate incentive framework under which SODECI did not
assume enough of the risks, and poor regulation and monitoring of the sector.  The
fragmentation of sector responsibilities  and a lack of financial control led to serious
misallocation  of resources and overinvestment.  Investment decisions  were made by the Water
Directorate on the basis of extremely optimistic consumption forecasts.  As a result, projects
were overdesigned and construction of production facilities was favored over expansion of
distribution networks.  The inefficient and overdesigned rural systems were subsidized  by high
tariffs on urban users, particularly industrial customers.  The high tariffs depressed demand,
and revenues fell as industries recycled water and used less-costly  private sources (which were
not adequately regulated and taxed due to lax enforcement of existing laws).  When
consumption fell short of projections, the financial situation of SODECI, because of the terms
of its contract, was protected at the expense of the sector funds.
3.13  Poor planning and management of the sewerage subsector and insufficient
resource allocation for maintenance by FNA undermined SODECI's incentives to control costs
and made it difficult to  monitor and evaluate the performance of the contractor.  In sum, the
lack of coordination among the Water Directorate, SODECI, and the sector funds, and an
inadequate risk/incentive framework raised costs, diminished the accountability of these
institution-, and wveakened  the government's ability to negotiate with and monitor SODECI.
3.14  Restructuring of the Water and Sanitation Sectors in C6te d'Ivoire.  In  1987,
the government began to  implement a restructuring program.  A concession contract was
negotiated with SODECI under which its compensation for operations was reduced.  SODECI9
is now responsible not only for operation and maintenance, but also for projecting demand
and planning and executing all investments ir. the urban water supply sector.  The Water
Directorate relinquished all investment responsibilities  in the water supply sector.  It
concentrates on the supervision and control of operations, while the Directorate of Major
Works supervises SODECI's investment-related activities.  Urban water tariffs are gradually
being reduced to levels that  are consistent with long-term marginal costs for water supply and
sanitation. 9
3.15  Responsibility for investments in the sanitation and rural water supply sectors
was assigned to the Directorate of Major Works.  An operation and maintenance contract for
the Abidjan sewerage and drainage system was awarded to  SODECI, with unit prices
substantially  lower than in the previous contract, and with a medium-term plan to transform
the arrangement into a lease contract under which the operator would assume greater
responsibility and risks.  Responsibility  for maintenance of rural water systems is to be
gradually transferred to villagers w,  kr  guidelines that have been tested in the government'r
pre-existing Eau Toujours Progrl-  r-ancing  for rehabilitation of handpumps and for trai: irg.Y
and community development activ, . s provided by the Second Wat r Supply Project (Lr.
2130-IVC).  Complementary action  A .tl be financed by other donors.
3.16  The 1988 budget law e.  blished the legal framework for controlling the
unauthorized tapping of groundwater -csources throughout the country.  A decree establishing
a system for the official declaration of well drilling will be enacted, and SODECI will be
empowered to enforce these controls and to carry out  an exhaustive inventory of private wells
subject to the extraction fee.  FNH and FNA were abolished, and a single entity was created
to manage the public water and sanitation debt.
3.17  Lessons from C6te d'Ivoire.  Several lessons can be learned from this
experience.  These lessons will be referred to  later in this paper when the restructuring of
Guinea's urban water supply sector is examined.
O  Fragmentation of responsibilities  for planning, investment, operations,
maintenance, and debt service may lead to lack of accountability  and inefficiency
because actors do not have an appropriate level of control over decisions and
actions that affect their efficiency.
*  Rural and urban water supply require drastically different institutional and
financial approaches.  Therefore, it may not  be wise to assign responsibility for
the two to  a single operator.
9.  The difficulty  of accommodating  both economic  and financial  criteria in adopting  a pricing  policy
for the water supply  sector has long been acknowledged.  (See Robert J. Saunders,  Jeremy  J. Warford,
and Patrick  C. Mann,  The Definition  and Role of Marginal  Cost in Public  Utility Pricing: Problems  of
Application  in the Water Supply  Sector,  The World Bank,  Central Projects  Staff,  Research  Working
Papers Series,  P.U. Report No. RES 6, 1976.)  Short-run  marginal  cost generally  does not cover  all
financial  costs. Since long-run  marginal  cost usually  covers  financial  costs more completely,  it has been
favored  as the basis  of price policy  in Bank-financed  water supply  projects.10
*  Excessive  subsidization of rural water services through high tariffs on urban and
industrial users may not prove viable because the high tariffs may lead to
reductions in demand and thus in revenues.
*  Private sector involvement in the delivery of public services does not in itself
guarantee efficiency;  the role of the oversight agency is crucial, and incentives
for efficiency must be incorporated into contracts and institutional relationships.
4.  The Urban Water  Supply Sector in Guinea:  Recent History
4.1  In 1989, despite adequate water resources, the Republic of Guinea had one  of
the least developed urban water supply sectors in West Africa.  Only 10 urban centers out of
33, plus the mining city of Fria that has a private system, were partiaily equipped with
distribution systems. In addition, three new systems were under construction.  Less than
40 percent of the 2.3 million urban dwellers (of which about 1 million live in the capital city
of Conakry) had access to piped water either through connections or standpipes.  The
remaining population relied on private wells or cisterns for their water.  For those with access
to piped water, the quality of service was low.  There were frequent interruptions in service
and water treatment was often bypassed or inadequate.
Sector Organization
4.2  The State Secretariat for Energy (SSE), part  of  the Ministry of Natural
Resources and the Environment (MRNE), is responsible for the urban water supply sector in
Guinea.  Until the recent reorganization under the Second Water Supply Project, the
Directorate for Energy Sources (DGSE) of SSE was in charge of programming,  financing, and
executing urban water supply projects, while the national water company, Entreprise Nationale
de Distribution  des Eaux  de  Guined (DEG), was responsible for operation, maintenance, billing
and collection in Conakry and the secondary urban centers.  Sector-related debt was serviced
by the national budget.  DEG was formerly responsible for maintenance of the Conakry piped
sewerage, but this task was recently taken over by the local government, which is also
responsible for solid waste collection and disposal.
4.3  In theory, DEG could have acted as an autonomous agency, but its Board, with
representatives of several ministries, never met.  In fact, DEG was treated and managed as a
MRNE department with only an illusory separate legal personality.  In the past, frequent
changes in top management and persistent interference in day-to-day  management, including
the appointment of employees, made it impossible for DEG to take advantage of technical
assistance and develop appropriate internal controls.
The First Water Supply and Sanitation Project
4.4  The Bank Group's first Conakry Water Supply and Sanitation Project (Credit
870-GUI) was approved in December 1976 and closed in March 1985.  The physical
components that were implemented were subject to substantial delays, and some physical
components were not implemented as extensively  as originally  planned.  Despite heavy
technical assistance, institutional development and financial performance under the project
were extremely disappointing.  During and following  the project, existing facilities have11
remained in poor condition, and maintenance has been inadequate.  A major rehabilitation
program is now needed.
4.5  Much of the blame for the poor performance of the first project can be
attributed to political interference and the poor economic environment that prevailed
throughout implementation.  Although the overall situation in the country has begua 1 to
improve, the performance of the urban water supply sector has remained poor.  Chronic
shortages of foreign exchange, lack of qualified staff, and low staff morale have contributed to
substandard operations and the poor quality of service.  Inadequate tariffs, weak billing
procedures, a low collection ratio, and the absence of internal controls have created a poor
financial position.
Cost Recovery
4.6  The principle of charging users for piped water seems to be accepted by both
the government and the population, but in the past rates were set at extremely low levels that
usually did not cover operating costs and depreciation.  Moreover, inadequate commercial
procedures, illegal extensions of connections, and the disappearance or disrepair of many
meters created a situation where water could be consumed without being paid for.  Revenues
collected through billings sometimes did not cover even cash operating costs.  DEG survived
only because the central government and municipalities  regularly paid their bills (on the basis
of estimated consumption that was budgeted at the beginning of each fiscal year until 1985)
and because the government provided annual operating subsidies.  Attempts were made under
the first project to clean up long-standing  arrears with private customers, but these actions
were not followed by new procedures to  avoid future accumulation of unpaid bills.  This
absence of discipline on the part of customers and the utility has typified almost all Guinean
public services in the past.  Recent experience in the urban transportation sector, however, has
shown that the population is willing to pay reasonable charges for good service if cost recovery
procedures are strictly enforced.
The Need for Radical Institutional Reform
4.7  The First Water Supply and Sanitation Project and other simila. projects in
Guinea and in neighboring countries have demonstrated that grafting technical assistance teams
onto extremely weak institutions does not lead to satisfactory project implementation and
institutional development.  The Project Completion Report for the first project concluded with
this recommendation:
"Institutional reforms to strengthen the sector's financial capability
and promote improved systems would be the predominant
components proposed in preparing a new project....  Though
substantial technical assistance will still be needed, it is clear from
experience under this project that this will almost certainly again
be fruitless unless accompanied by a radical reshaping of
institutional responsibilities.... In the opinion of projects staff, the
shortcomings  of the [sector] can be remedied most successfully  by12
a more commercial and entrepreneurial approach, preferably by a
degree  of privatization."10
4.8  Since increased efficiency  and expansion of services were desirable in Guinea,
and since the potential for both was considerable, an arrangement that promoted these
objectives promised potential benefits for both the country and for a private partner, provided
satisfactory contractual provisions were designed to protect the interests of each, and that
political and economic barriers could be removed.
5.  The Restructuring  of Guinea's Water  Supply Sector
5.1  In 1987, the Government of Guinea began to restructure the water supply
sector, with assistance provided through IDA's Project Preparation Facility.  Eventually, the
Directorate for Energy Services and the national water company were replaced with two new
companies: a state-owned national water authority, Socite  Nationale des Eaux de Guin6e
(SONEG), and a water management company, Societe d'Exploitation  des Eaux de Guinee
(SEEG).
5.2  SONEG owns the urban water supply facilities in Conakry and secondary
centers.  It  is fully responsible for sector development including identification, preparation,
financing and implementation of new projects.  SONEG also is responsible for issuing sectoral
consolidated accounts and servicing the debt.
5.3  SEEG is jointly owned by the state and a professional private partner, the
Foreign Investor-Manager (FIM).  Within the framework of a ten-year lease contract with
SONEG, it is responsible for operating and maintaining urban water supply facilities and billing
customers and collecting charges.  In addition, SEEG has entered into a management contract
with the FIM under which the latter will provide home-office support for day-to-day
management, regular audits of procedures, and assistance for procurement and selection of
SEEG's expatriate staff.
5.4  The government reorganized the sector with the assistance of consultants and
legal counsel through a complete revision of the sectoral legal framework, the closing of DEG,
and the negotiation of the relevant contracts among the various parties involved.  Key
documents (which are described in Annex 2) include:
*  the enterprise contract between the State of Guinea and SONEG,
*  SONEG's statutes,
*  the urban water supply general regulations,
*  the shareholders' agreement between the state and the FIM for the creation of
SEEG,
*  SEEG's  statutes,
*  the lease contract between SONEG and SEEG, and
*  the  management  contract  between  SEEG  and  the  FIM.
10. World  Bank, Project  Completion  Report, Republic  of Guinea,  Conakry  Water Supply  and
Sanitation  Project (Credit  870-GUI),  August  31, 1987,  p. 23.13
5.5  Liquidation  of  DEG  was completed  by  December  31,  1989.  Staff who  were  not
transferred  to  positions  in SEEG,  SONEG,  or  other  civil service jobs  were  laid off.
Selection  of the  FIM
5.6  As this  project  began  to  take  shape,  there  was a  great  deal  of uncertainty  and
discussion within  the  Bank  as to  whether  the  lease  contract  between  SONEG  and  SEEG  could
be  financed  by  the  Bank and,  if so,  under  which  guidelines.  While  these  questions  were
being  resolved,  processing  of the  project  was delayed  considerably.  There  appeared  to  be  no
precedent  for  Bank  financing  of such a  contract  arrangement.  In the  past,  the  Bank  had
financed  specific goods  and  services  to  be  procured  within  the  context  of such  an  arrangement
(for  example,  in Cote  d'Ivoire),  but  not  the  contract  as a  package  deal.  Neither  the  Bank's
procurement  guidelines  nor  the. guidelines  for  the  use  of consultants  provide  explicit  guidance
for  tendering  and  awarding  lease  contracts.11
5.7  The  Procurement  Issue.  The  project  design,  as proposed,  called for  selection  of
SEEG's  major  shareholder  (the  FIM)  on  the  basis  of the  lowest lease-contractor  rate  (LCR)
bid.  A  representative  of  the  Bank's  Legal  Department  pointed  out  that,  not  only  was this
contrary  to  the  procurement  guidelines,  but  it was also hard  to  imagine  that  a  foreign  firm
would  be wilMing  to  participate  under  such terms.  Instead,  it was suggested  that  the  technical
services  of the  foreign  firm  be  contracted  under  a traditional  management  contract  in
accordance  with the  guidelines  for  the  use  of consultants,  and  that  equipment  be  procured
separately  in accordance  with  the  procurement  guidelines.12 Though  this  formula  had  the
merit  of being  squarely in  line with  Bank practice,  it was unacceptable  to  the  project's  authors.
They  felt  it would  eliminate  the  most  innovative element  of  the  proposed  project  design:  the
assumption  of commercial  risk by the  lease  contractor  and  therefore  the  FIM  as a  partner  in
the  lease-contract  arrangement.
5.8  Neither  set  of guidelines was entirely  satisfactory  for  this  type  of contract,  but  it was
argued  that  the  provision  of  a cubic  meter  of water  (distributed,  billed,  and  collected)  has
more  in common  with the  provision  of civil works  than  with consultants'  services.  As long  as
there  is fair competition  among  potential  ELMs, the  lowest  LCR  bid constitutes  the  lowest-cost
option  for  the  operation  of water  supply services, even  if the  inputs  are  not  procured  at  the
lowest price  each  by the  selected  contractor.  Ultimately,  the  Bank's  guidelines  for
procurement  of works  and  goods were  applied  to  the  selection  of  the  FIM.  Since  the  goods
11.  The procurement guidelines apply to goods, works, and related services such as transportation,
installation, training.  The object of these guidelines is to ensure that goods and works financed by the
Bank are procured fairly and at lowest cost from Bank-eligible  countries (that is, Bank members,
Switzerland  or Taiwan).  To this end, international competitive bidding (ICB) is prescribed.  Consultant
services, unlike goods and works, are not considered to be standard in nature and are therefore less
subject to evaluation on  the basis of price.  According to the Bank's guidelines, other considerations
such as competence, experience and the client-consultant relationship are the principal factors to be
considered in choosing consultants.  In the award of consultancy  contracts, price may be considered,
but only secondarily. Consequently, proposals for consultant contracts may be solicited from a "short
list' of firms or individuals.  International competitive bidding is not required.
12.  Under the proposed lease-contract arrangement, as for all contracts awarded after international
competitive bidding on the basis of the most advantageous bid, equipment to be procured by the lease
contractor in fulfilling its obligations would not be subject to ICB.14
and services to be procured under the contract, and financed by IDA, would be indirectly
subject tc, the Bank's international competitive bidding guidelines, it was stipulated that they
would have to be provided by Bank-eligible  countries.  Equipment and works to be procured
for tne rehabilitation program and system expansion,  which are not part of the lease contract.
would be procured through international competitive bidding.
5.9  The Selection Process.  Before soliciting bids from potential FIMs, the government,
with assistance provided under IDA's Project Preparation Facility, prepared drafts of the
various legal documents and established a plan for financing overall sector costs through
increased consumer tariffs, international financing, and budgetary contributions.  In order to
ensure transparency and fairness, the selection of the FIM was carried out, after international
competitive bidding, on the sole basis of financial proposals made by prequalified professional
companies.  The six prequalified companies (four from France, one from Tunisia, and one
from the United Kingdom) were all large water distribution companies that met the technical
and financial prequalification criteria.  The preselection document described Guinea's water
supply sector, the proposed institutional reforms, and the requirements and instructions for
preselection.  The bidding documents described the roles of the state and of the two
companies to  be created, SONEG and SEEG; the proposed financial arrangements; SEEG's
responsibilities  with respect to  rehabilitation and maintenance, the instructions for completing
bids; and rules governing the submission of bids.
5.10  A draft lease contract, including the detailed specifications,  was reviewed by Bank
staff and five of the prequalified firms that attended a prebid conference in Conakry.  Their
comments, as well as those of Bank staff, were incorporated into the final draft version of the
lease contract.  It was attached to  the bidding documents with drafts of SEEG's shareholders'
agreement, SEEG's statutes, and the management and subscription contracts.
5.11  The only parameters used to select the final candidate were the lease-contractor rate
(LCR) that SEEG would retain on each cubic meter of water collected, and the price that
SEEG would charge the customers for new connections.  The prequalified FIMs were placed
in similar financial conditions:  in particular, the bidding documents specified the initial equity
contribution the FIM would make to SEEG (about $1.55 million out of $3.0 million), the
apportioning of dividends,  and the remuneration of the FIM for the management assistance
contract with SEEG (set at 2 percent of SEEG's revenues). 13
5.12  Though six companies had been prequ ilified,  only two bids were submitted.  'fhe
four French companies co-tbined to form two c  nsortia.  A joint venture of Cornpagnie
Gh,Mrale  des Eaux, the largest French private water distribution company, and SAUR, the
third-largest French private water distributor in France and one of the main shareholders of
the Ivorian SODECI, submitted the lowest bid, about 30 percent below consultant estirnates,
and was selected by the government in accordance with evaluation procedures agreed upon
with the Bank.  The second bid, by a joint venture of the two other French companies, was
13 percent below consultant estimates.  The other prequalified candidates did not submit bids.
The U.K  company, a large public water authority that was in the process of being privatized,
cited delays in the completion of its privatization as the reason for its withdrawal from the
13. The complete  set of preselection  and bidding  documents,  including  draft legislation  and contracts,
is available  in the Africa  Information  Center. All documents  are in French. See document  numbcrs
D00245,  D06542,  D09533,  D09535,  D09537.  D09540.15
competition.  The  Tunisian  concern  became  a casualty  of  political changes  in  Tunisia  just  prior
to  the  bid sTibmission deadline.
5.13  Under  the  circumstances,  competition  was indeed  somewhat  limited.  Nevertheless,  in
terms  of  the  final  cost  of the  service,  the  outcome  appears  to  have  been  favorable  from  the
point  of view of the  government  and  consumers.
The  Water  Management  Company, Soci&u6  d'Exploitatinn  des Eaux de Guine6 (SEEG'
5.14  Management  and  Organization.  The  chairman  of  the  Board  of  SEEG  is chosen  by
the  government,  and  the  general  manager  is nominated  by  the  FIM,  subject  to  the  approval  of
SEEG's  Board.  Certain  important  decisions  (such  as approval  of  the  annual  budget,  signing of
large  contracts,  approval  of  nonbudgeted  commitments  of over  GF  100 million, proposals  for
the  distribution  of dividends,  and  changes  in or  renewal  of the  lease  contract)  must be
approved  by a  75  percent  majority of the  Board.  This means  that  the  FIM  cannot  make
important  decisions  without  the  concurrence  of  at  least one  of the  Board  members
representing  the  state;  since  the  state's  representatives  usually vote  in  unison,  such decisions
will generally  have  to  be  reached  by  consensus." 4 Decisions  concerning  day-to-day
management  within  the  limit of the  approved  budget  are  left  entirely  to  the  general  manager.
5.15  Operational  Provisions.  SEEG  is free  to  define  its own  organization  and  procedures
to  meet  its contractual  obligations.  It  is free  to  hire  and  fire staff, both  local and  expatriate,
although  initially it was asked  to  give preference  to  laid-off  DEG  staff.  The  company will
procure  its imports  (chemicals,  parts  for  regular  maintenance  or  construction  of new
connections)  in  accordance  with  industrial  practices  approved  by its Board  from  Bank-eligible
countries  only.  Under  the  terms  of the  lease  contract,  SEEG  is permitted  to  maintain  bank
accounts  in  local or  foreign  cur  'ncy and  to  transfer  money  freely.
5.16  Tax and  Tariff  Concessions.  SEEG  enjoys certain  tax  and  import  tariff  concessions
for  a period  of six years,  until  1995.  With  one  exception,  these  are  the  same  concessions  that
other  firms are  entitled  to  under  Guinea's  investment  code.  The  exception,  a  partial
exemption  from  taxes  on  oil  products,  has  proveii difficult  to  implement  because  SEEG  must
pay  the  taxes  when  it purchases  fuel from  suppliers  and  then  must  request  a  refund  from  the
government,  which  is chronically  short  of funds.  Since  all  LCR  bids were  net  of taxes, none
of these  exemptions  represents  additional  revenue  to  SEEG  over  and  above  its LCR  bid.
5.17  Maintenance  and  Rehabilitation.  SEEG  is responsible  for  regular  maintenance  of
the  facilities, including  replacement  of works  and  parts  as necessary  but  excluding catchments,
civil works,  and  pipes  greater  than  160 millimeters in diameter,  all of which  are  the
responsibility  of SONEG.  The  condition  of existing installations  and  rehabilitation  needs  are
specified  in  a detailed  inventory  for  each  of  the  urban  systems  at  the  time  it is turned  over  to
SEEG.  A  $5.0 million rehabilitation  program  (financed  by the  IDA  credit)  will he  carried  out
14.  Should at  least 24 percent of the state's 49 percent share eventually be sold to private Guineans,
this provision would continue to require some local consent for major decisions, but the government
would no longer have a de facto veto over proposals favored by the private shareholders, foreign and
local.  In fact, such an event is desirable and would make it possible for the country to take full
advantage of private resources and fully reap the efficiency  bencfits of private sector involvement. This
will be possible only after the Guinean private sector develops further and capital markets emerge.16
by SEEG, and the inventories will be revised to reflect the rehabilitation as it is completed. 15
At the end of the lease-contract period, SEEG will be responsible for returning facilities to
SONEG in the condition specified in the inventories.
5.18  Penalties.  SEEG is required to post and maintain a performance bond of
GF 200 million ($400,000). These funds will he applied against any penalties SEEG might
incur for failure to meet service standards after an initial grace period of two years, or failure
to submit annual accounts and reports.
5.19  Initial Performance.  The lease contract took effect whern  the IDA credit became
effective in October 1989.  The initial start-up of operations under the lease contract went
well.  By December, a new billing system that simplified the identification of customer
accounts and made it difficult for customers to avoid paying for water service had been put
into place.  Installation of the system progressed much faster than originally  expected.
However, project staff now expect some delays in the implementation of the rehabilitation
program (for which supplies must be procured under international competitive bidding).
The National Water Authority, Soci&t6  Nationale des Eaux de Guin6e (SONEG)
5.20  Organization.  SONEG has two departments:  Finance and Administration,  which
handles sector accounting and general administration, and monitors SEEG's performance; and
Studies and New Works, which is responsible for identification, preparation and supervision of
new projects (including the expansion of the Conakry system financed under the project as
well as other investment projects being financed by other donors).  The IDA credit is
financing an advisor to  SONEG's general manager to assist in general sector planning and
financial management, and an advisor to the head of the Department of Studies and New
Works to assist in establishing project management procedures, as wel! as occasional short-term
consultancies.
5.21  Staffing.  Before DEG was abolished, it employed about 500 staff, of whom
15 percent were professional, 32 percent were skilled or semiskilled,  and 53 percent were
unskilled workers.  In addition, DCSE staff in charge of the urban water supply sector
numbered about 15, fewer than 10 of whom were professionals.  Under the new arrangements,
SONEG's staff will total about 60 and SEEG's about 250.  Of the laid-off DEG staff, about
200 of the former staff have been hired by SEEG, 40 have been retained by SONEG, and 30
qualified for other jobs in the civil service.  SEEG appears to have attracted the most highly
qualified individuals. SONEG's staff, though i  includes a few very competent individuals,  is
relatively weaker.
5.22  Staff of DGSE and DEG who were not selected for the two new companies were
phased out.  It was originally  foreseen that the IDA credit would finance a training program
to be implemented in Conakry by a Canadian nongovernmental organization in the field of
plumbing, air conditioning and electromechanics for those laid-off staff who wanted to  launch
their own businesses, but this program has so far failed to  materialize.
15. Since  actual rehabilitation  needs exceed  this amount, further financing  from other donors is being
sought.17
5.23  SONEG's Role with Regard to SEEG.  SONEG is respopsible for monitoring the
performance of SEEG in discharging  its obligations under the lease contract (for example,
water supply standards, implementation of the rehabilitation program, and proper maintenance).
It also adjusts and if necessary renegotiates SEEG's remuneration, the lease-contract rate.
(SONEG's capacity to fulfill this role is discussed in paragraphs 5.37-5.42.)
Financial Arrangements and the Role of the IDA Credit
5.24  Tariffs.  For each cubic meter of water consumed, SEEG is eventually expected to:
(a)  collect from the customers the 'full water rate" (that is, a rate sufficient to
cover sectoral operating expenses and yield an acceptable rate of return on
SONEG's assets);
(b)  retain part of collected revenues, the "lease-contractor rate," to cover its own
operating expenses (in both foreign exchange and local currency), depreciate its
own assets, and provide a return on its equity; and
(c)  pay part of collected revenues to SONEG as a "rental fee"  interided to cover
SONEG's own operating expenses, service the sectoral debt, and finance part of
the investment program.
5.25  During the initial years of implementation of the new institutional arrangements,
revenues generated locally through the consumer rate are expected to be insufficient to cover
the full water rate.  The consumer rate, which was raised from GF 60 per cubic meter
($0.12/cubic meter) to GF 150 per cubic meter ($0.30/cubic  meter) early in 1989, is sufficient
to cover SEEG's expenses in local currency and a rental fee that would cover SONEG's
operating expenses and generate cash to finance part of the investment program.  Therefore,
it is envisaged that the foreign exchange portion of the LCR will be covered by the IDA
credit, but on  a declining basis. 16 The IDA credit will finance the foreign expenditures of the
lease contract on the basis of a Rari passu formula by simply  multiplying  the volume of water
for which revenues were collected by SEEG by the foreign exchange component of the LCR,
and then applying a declining percentage.  The volume of collection will be confirmed every
four months by independent auditors.
5.26  The National Budget will help cover sectoral debt service (SONEG's responsibility),
also on a declining basis.  The level of the support for each year will be specified in the
enterprise contract between SONEG and the state.  The figure shows the breakdown of the
full cost of water into two components:  SEEG's operating costs (the LCR), and other
financial needs of the sector (SONEG's operating costs, its contribution to new investments,
and debt service).  The consumer rate, which SEEG collects and which currently covers only
part of the full cost of water, is divided into the part that SEEG retains (consumers'
contribution to the lease-contractor rate) and the part that SEEG pays to SONEG as a rental
fee.  The Figure also shows how external financing (for foreign expenditures) and support
from the National Budget (for debt service) fill the gap between the consumer rate  and the
16.  It is normal  practice  under operations  financed  by the World  Bank for the contractor  to be
protected  against  foreign  exchange  risks,  but ultimately  SEEG will  assume that risk along with the
other commercial  risks it has already  assumed.18
full cost  of water  on  a  declining  basis  as the  sectoral  financial  burden  is gradually  transferred
to  the  customer.  After  six years of  implementation  of the  new arrangcments  (the  duration  of
the  IDA  project),  the  consumer  rate  should  be  sufficient  to  cover  not only  the  local operating
costs  and  depreciation  of  both  SONEG  and  SEEG,  but  also the  sectoral  debt  and  about  40
percent  of  the  foreign  exchange  portion  of the  LCR.
5.27  The  table  on  page  20  shows the  projected  evolution  of the  full cost  of  water  and  a
breakdown  of  its main components  as well as the  cost  sharing  between  consumcrs,  the
National  Budget,  and  cxternal  financing.  Note  that  tariff-s will not  bc  increased  again  until
1991, and  the  l CR  will be  adjustcd  periodically  by the  application  of cost  index  formulas.
5.28  Givcn  the  uncertainty  of  present  consumption  patterns  and  the  low tariff  levcl, it is
ncither  feasible  nor  desirable  to  establish  immcdliately a  rate  structure  based  on  categorics  of
water  users or  increasing block  rates.  Differentiail pricing  (under  which  water  consumption  by
low-income  houscholds  could  be subsidizcd,  for  cxample),  will be  introduced  once  consumption
has  been  fully metered  and  rccorded  ovcr  a  sufficient  period  of time.  In order  to encourage
the  efficient  use  of water  by households  and  to  avoid excessive tariffs for  industrial,
administrative,  and  commcrcial  customcrs  that  might  result  in the  reduction  of  revenues  or  the
collection  ratio,  the  government  has agreed  that  the  lowest  rate  applied  to  any specific
category  of customers  would be  at  Icast equal  to  120 percent  of  the  average  cash  operating
costs  of  both  SEEG  and  SONEG.  The  social block  rate  could  be  introduced  in  1991 when  a
projectcd  tariff  increase  would  raise  average  tariffs above  120 pcrcent  of  operating  costs.
5.29  The  success of  this  plan  depends  on  a  number  of factors,  not  the  least  of which  is
the  government's  commitment  to  raising  tariffs commensurate  with  evolving costs.  SEEG's  and
SONEG's  revenues  will depend  on  the  evolution  of demand  as a  result  of expansion  and  in
response  to  improved service  and  increased  tariffs,  and  on  SEEG's  success  in improving
collection.  Even  if sectoral  finances  evolve  as projected,  there  would  be  a  continuing  need  for
external  financing  beyond  the  six-year duration  of the  Second  Water  Supply  Project.  Not  until
1998 are  tariffs and  the  full cost  of water  expected  to  be  in  equilibrium.
5.30  Local  and  Central  Government  Water  Bills.  Although  payment  of water  bills by
government  agencies  has  not  posed  a  problem  in the  past,  SEEG  is protected  from  a  potential
problem  in this  regard  in several ways.  The  enterprise  contract  between  the  state  and
SONEG  indicates detailed  budlgeting and  payment  procedures  for  administrative  and  municipal
water  bills, and  the  Lease  Contract  stipulates  that  the  foreign  exchange  portion  of the  LCR
that  is financed  by IDA  will be  paid on  at  least onethird  of  administrative  billings, even  if
actual  collection  is lower.  Finally,  SEEG  is permitted  to  cut  off water  supply  to  any  agencies
that  fail  to  pay.
5.31  Adjustment  of  the  Lease  Contract  Rate.  The  foreign  exchange  component  of the
LCR  will be  adjusted  quarterly,  and  the  local currency  component  will be revised  semiannually
in accordance  with  cost  index  formulas that  allow 90  percent  of weighted  cost  increases  or
decreases  to  be  reflected  in  the  adjusted  LCR.  This  provision  is quite  favorable  for  SEEG,
and  it  reduces  some  of  the  risk the  lease  contractor  assumes.  Both  the  level of  the  LCR  and
the  indexation  formulas  will be renegotiated  after  four  years; at  that  time,  the  government
(through  SONEG)  will have  an  opportunity  to  push  for  changes  in both  if greater  efficiency
seems  possible.19
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This figure shows the general principle of cost sharing between the consumer,
the National Budget, and external financing.20
WATER RATES AND COSTS, 1989-90
(Guinean francs per cubic meter at current prices)
Item  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998
Full cost of water
Lease-contractor
rate  195  217  229  237  214  219  219  219  219  219
SONEG operating
expenses  11  11  10  10  9  8  8  7  6  6
Debt service  139  165  191  210  196  272  361  336  286  272
Participation in
investments /a  52  43  90  76  126  160  38  46  75  68
Total  398  436  520  533  545  660  625  608  587  566
Constant 1989
$/cubic meter  0.75  0.74  0.83  0.82  0.80  0.93  n.85  0.79  0.74  0.68
Cost sharing
Consumer rate  150  150  239  274  356  520  561  566  566  566
of which:
Rental fee
to SONEG  (64)  (55)  (138)  (170)  (252)  (386)  (406)  (389)  (368)  (346)
National Budget  139  165  153  126  78  54  0  0  0  0
External finan-
cing  109  121  128  133  110  86  64  43  21  0
Total  398  436  520  533  545  660  625  608  587  566
Consumer rate/
full cost (%)  38  34  46  51  65  79  90  93  96  100
la  Balance required to generate adequate returns on SONEG's net assets.
NOTE:  Totals may not add up due to rounding.
Selected Issues
5.32  Profitability and the Motives of the Foreign Investor-Manager.  Financial
projections carried out by Bank staff indicate a net return on SEEG's equity in the range of
12 percent to 18 percent annually over the life of the contract, a respectable and reasonable
profit.  It is safe to assume that the foreign partners probably expect to  benefit in other,
perfectly legitimate, ways from this venture (for example, through the enhancement of their
expertise and networks, and the establishment of their pre-eminence in the region).  In fact,21
SAUR (one of the members of the French consortium which became the FIM, and also a
shareholder of SODECI) had been looking for such an opportunity to expand operations in
Africa for some time.  With its many years of experience in operations in another West
African country, it was in a position to  calculate costs fairly accurately and to  minimize certain
start-up costs.  For example, it had already developed an effective billing system in Cote
d'Ivoire that would be applicable to  the Guinean situation.  This may explain how it was able,
with CGE, to prepare a bid that was substantially  lower than expected.
5.33  As regards the direct financial returns of the arrangement, during negotiations with
the government for the management contract with SEEG, the FIM attempted unsuccessfully  to
obtain a higher fee than the 2 percent stipulated in the bidding documents.
5.34  Separation of Planning and Investment from Operations.  In Cote d'Ivoire the
separation of responsibilities  for sector management appears to have resulted in a lack of
accountability and orficiency  because the various actors had inadequate control over decisions
and actions that affected their performance.  For example, a ministerial department that did
not depend directly on sector revenues was responsible for planning investments.  While
designers of the Guinea arrangement believed that it would be preferable to  assign
responsibility for planning, investment, debt service and operations to a single entity, they
concluded that it would be unrealistic to expect a private operator to  assume the burden of
existing debt service and future investments, which will necessarily be heavy, given the current
physical and financial status of the sector.  Their project design allocated responsibility for
planning, investment, tariff setting, and eventually debt service to SONEG, while operations
and most of the maintenance were assigned to the contractor, SEEG.  Not all analysts would
agree that it is preferable to combine all of these functions in one entity;  some would argue
that decentralization increases efficiency by allowing agencies to specialize in one or two
functions and by increasing the level of responsibility  of working-level  staff.  All analysts would
probably agree that the incentive to perform each essential function satisfactorily must
somehow be deliberately incorporated into the institutional setup, and that when functions are
separated. incentives and channels for cooperation become important.
5.35  In contrast to the former arrangement in Cote d'Ivoire, the arrangement in
Guinea gives the state enterprise SONEG an incentive to pursue sector efficiency and financial
viability because its own income and its ability,  eventually, to  service the debt and contribute
to investments will depend on its shrewdness in planning investments, setting tariffs that cover
sector costs, and negotiating with SEEG adjustments in the lease-contractor rate.  The viability
of SEEG depends primarily  on its success in improving operational efficiency and collections.
These arrangements provide a substantial measure of accountability as well as appropriate
incentives.
5.36  However, there  is one obvious weakness in the division of responsibilities  between
SONEG and SEEG.  SONEG will plan and execute all new investments and SEEG is
expected to  take over and operate  them, but there is no provision for consultation between
the two entities on the planning of investments, and such consultation might be considered
inappropriate."7 As a result, SEEG will have no voice in investment decisions that will affect
17. Under the terms of the lease contract,  SONEG  may  assign  responsibility  for the operation  of new
investments  to SEEG, but it does not have  to do so.  SEEG, on the other hand, is expected  to accept
all operating  responsibilities  that SONEG  assigns  to it.22
its ability to  operate  efficiently; if  SEEG  should  subsequently  argue  that  an  investment  was
poorly  planned  and  cannot  be  operated  efficiently, SONEG  niay  lose  some  leverage  in
negotiating  the  lease-contractor  rate.
5.37  SONEG's  Vulnerabilitv.  A  recent  study  of contract  plans  (CPs, also  known  as
enterprise  contracts)  reported  that,  while  CPs  have  been  useful  for  establishing  management
processes  and  creating  channels  for  dialog  between  state  enterprises  and  the  state,  they  "have
not  proven  to  be  legally enforceable  contracts."  Governments  cannot  be  sued  or othelwise
forced  to  comply with  their  obligations  as stated  in such  contracts.  In  fact, "persistent  non-
compliance  with  terms  of  the  CPs  has  discouraged  and  demotivated  enterprise  managers."1 8 A
major  source  of  problems  has  been  the  unreliability  of government  subsidies or  transfers  to
support  the  operations  of state  enterprises.
5.38  A  review  of SONEG's  enterprise  contract  reveals  that  SONEG  may not  be  as
vulnerable  as many state  enterprises  in this  regard.  The  company  is not  directly  dependent  on
the  government  for  operating  transfers  or  subsidies.  On  the  contrary,  the  sector  is expectcd  to
become  self-sufficient.  SONEG  is authorized  to  propose  and,  after  approval  of  the  State
Secretariat  for  Energy, set  tariffs that  will cover:  SEEG's  local operating  costs; an  incrcasing
percentage  of SEEG's  foreign  exchange  costs; all  of SONEG's  own  operating  costs,  including
depreciation;  an increasing  percentage  of the  sector's  debt  service;  and  an  acceptable  return  on
SONEG's  assets  (that  would  be  used  as SONEG's  contribution  to  future  sector  investments).
The  state  agrees  to  pay  all  of the  sector  debt  for  two years,  and  a  gradually decreasing  portion
of the  debt  for  four  additional  years.  There  is no  provision  for  the  government  to  contribute
to  SONEG's  operating  costs  or  investmen.  funds, should  tariff  revenues  fall short.
5.39  These  arrangements  could  leave  SONEG  somewhat  vulnerable  to  operating
shortfalls.  Even  though  the  government  appears  to  be committed  to  gradually  increasing  tariffs
to  a  level that  would  cover  all  sector  operating  expenses  and  vield an  acceptable  rate  of return
on  SONEG's  assets, there  is no  guarantee  that  it or  its oversight  agent,  the  State  Secretariat
for  energy,  will approve  the  tariff  increases  that  SONEG  proposes  to  mcet  this objective.19 In
the  event  that  tariffs  are  not  increased  to  a  level that  covers  the  lease-contractor  rate  and
SONEG's  operating  costs  as well  as a  return  on  assets, the  lease  contract  guarantees  that
payment  of  the  LCR  to  SEEG  would  have  first  priority.  As a  result,  SONEG's  revenues
would be  reduced  or  even  eliminated  before  SEEG's  would  be affected.  Inadequate  resources
for  SONEG  could  compromise  its ability to  supervise  the  lease  contract  and  to  carry out
sector  planning  and  investment  activities.
5.40  The  study  of enterprise  contracts  concluded:  "They should  be  kept  short  and
simple.  Emphasis  should  be  placed  on  goal  clarification,  an increase  in  managerial  autonomy,
18.  John Nellis, Contract  Plans and Public Enterprise  Performnance,  World Bank, Policy, Planning, and
Research Working Paper  118, October 1988, p. ix.
19.  The IDA credit agreement with the government requires that measures be taken, including tariff
adjustments, so that SONEG's revenues will generate a  1.5 percent rate of return on annually revalued
net assets in service from 1991 to  1993,  and a 2.5 percent rate of return from 1994 onward.  A
schedule of tariff increases is included in SONEG's enterprise contract.23
and open  negotiating between government and management." 20 SONEG's contract satisfies
this prescription, except that no formal mechanism for the resolution of disagreements between
SONEG and the state has been established, apparently because the legal system in Guinea is
still in an early stage of development.
5.41  SONEG's Strength vis-a-vis  SEEG.  The ability of SONEG to fulfill its role with
regard to SEEG will be a key factor in the success of the new arrangement.  The monitoring
function is fairly straightforward, and it will be simplified  in the short term by SEEG's interest
in improving  operations quickly to secure revenues.  However, because of the admittedly
dismal current state of operations and the impracticality  of enforcing service standards
immediately,  SONEG may develop a lax attitude toward its enforcement role and its need, as
a new institution, to develop the required skills and procedures for a firm enforcement stance
once the initial grace period is over.
5.42  Given the need for close collaboration between the two companies, there is also
the danger that, over time, SONEG's "arm's-length' attitude toward SEEG may be eroded, just
as happened in C6te d'Ivoire.  This would particularly endanger SONEG's position in adjusting
and renegotiating the lease-contractor rate.  To assist SONEG in developing a strong position
in these negotiations from the beginning, the IDA credit will finance occasional short-term
technical assistance for this purpose.
6.  Conclusions
Introduction of Competition and Incentives for Efficiency
6.1  The restructuring of the Guinea water supply sector represents a first step toward
improving the overall efficiency  of the system.  Through the bidding process for a lease
contract to operate  the water supply system, competition has been introduced into a public
service.  The linking of the revenues of the lease contractor, SEEG, with cost control and the
effectiveness of collection creates incentives for both technical and economic efficiency.  The
initial performance of the company during the early months of operation has been
encouraging.
Framework for Transfer of Skills and Responsibility
6.2  The arrangement with the foreign investor-manager as a shareholder in SEEG,
and as management consultant whose fees are also linked to SEEG's revenues, establishes a
framework that encourages effective training and the transfer of skills and responsibility  to
local staff.  Moreover, the time-frame of the lease contract, ten years, is more realistic for
achieving technical assistance objectives than the usual two- or three-year technical assistance
contract.
20.  Nellis, Contract Plans.24
Oversight Function
6.3  The participation of the private sector in the delivery of water supply services is
only a part of the reform.  The important tasks of proposing tariff adjustments, renegotiating
the lease-contractor rate, monitoring the performance of SEEG, and planning and
implementing invesLmaents  remain with the state enterprise SONEG.  A new lean organization
has been established and technical assistance personnel are in place, but the difficulty  of
creating effective oversight agencies is well known, and project staff expect to have significant
involvement supervising this crucial aspect of the project.
Tariffs and Financial Viabilitv
6.4  The govemment has indicated a willingness  to raise tariffs to a level that covers
operating expenses and sector debt service and yields a fmancial return on SONEG's assets so
that it can contribute to future investments; these increases are essential for the viability of
the arrangement.  SEEG's finances are protected somewhat more than SONEG's.  Although
Guniea's political and institutional structures have changed profoundly since the new
govemment was established in 1984, the country's political and economic environment remains
precarious.  The difficulty  of carrying out  reforms must not be underestimated.
Simplicity  of the Arrangement
6.5  The arrangement in Guinea is a remarkably simple one.  Unlike the previous
arrangement in CMte  d'Ivoire, it is limited to the urban water supply sector.  Neither SONEG
nor SEEG has any responsibility  for rural water supply, and urban sanitation is being handled
separately.  Although ultimately the natural links among these components will need to be
reinforced, in the medium term, this separation could be a good strategy, given the magnitude
of the sector's operational problems.
Separation of Investment and Operations
6.6  Under the current arrangement, responsibility  for planning, investment, and debt
service is separated from responsibility  for operations.  The first responsibility is SONEG's; the
second, SEEG's.  Under existing circumstances,  this separation was unavoidable.  Even though
the arrangement gives each entity a large degree of accountability,  it has some shortcomings.
SONEG may not be best placed to make wise investment decisions, and it labors under a
certain vulnerability vis-a-vis  SEEG; SEEG has no voice in planning new investments, and
therefore its incentives to operate efficiently may be compromised.  Consequently, once the
bulk of heavy urban investments has been completed, it may become desirable to convert the
lease contract to a concession or partial concession.
Guidelines for Lease Contracts and Concessions
6.7  After much internal discussion and delay, it was decided that the FIM would be
selected on the basis of the lowest LCR bid, following  the procedures outlined in the Bank's
guidelines for procurement of goods and services.  Though the procurement guidelines were
applied to  the selection of the contractor, the goods and services to be procured under the
terms of the contract are not subject to international competitive bidding; rather, the
contractor is free to procure these goods and related services according to  its own procedures,25
as long as they come from Bank-eligible countries.  An understanding was reached among the
various actors within the Bank so that this project could go forward, but the issue has not
been resolved definitively. There are currently no Bank guidelines for the selection of
contractors for lease contract or concession arrangements.  Given the growing interest of
borrowers in private sector operation of public services, and the response of the private sector,
this gap needs to be eliminated through the development of appropriate guidelines that reflect
the special nature of such arrangements.27  Annex I
Contractual Arrangements for Private Sector Participation
in Water Supply Operations
Service contract:  A government-owned  entity enters into a small management or
service contract with a private firm for the provision of specific services. This is the type of
arrangement under which technical assistance services are typically  provided, but more
operational services (such as metering, billing and collection, maintaining private connections,
or operating production facilities) may also be contracted.  The public authority retains overall
responsibility for operation and maintenance of the system, except for the specific services
contracted.  It bears all of the commercial risk and must finance fixed assets as well as
working capital.  Compensation may be on a time basis; on a lump-sum,  cost-plus, or fixed-fee
basis; or it may be proportional to  some physical parameters.  Service contracts are usually for
periods of less than five years.
Management contract:  The public authority transfers to a private company the entire
operation and maintenance function of the municipal service.  Compensation is usually
proportional to  physical parameters.  This arrangement is similar to a service contract, except
that the private company assumes overall responsibility  for operation and maintenance of the
system, with the freedom to make day-to-day management decisions but without assuming the
commercial risks.  A profit-sharing arrangement, under which the private firm would bear a
small part of the commercial  risk, is possible but unusual.  The duration of management
contracts is generally about five years.
Lease contract:  The system owned by the public authority is leased to  a private
company for operation  and maintenance, but unlike a management contract (with or without
profit sharing), the financial risk for operation and maintenance is borne entirely by the lessee.
Moreover, the lessee must finance working capital and replacement of components with a
short economic life, but  not extensions to the fixed assets.  The equipment must be returned
to  the authority in good repair at the end of the contract.  The lessee retains a portion of
tariff revenues as compensation and pays the remainder to  the authority as a rental fee.  The
portion retained by the lessee is established in the lease contract as a result of competitive
bidding or negotiation, and it may be adjusted regularly to reflect changing cost conditions or
renegotiated at a specified time during contract execution.  The tariff level and the rental fee
are usually specified by the public authority or a regulatory body.  The duration of this type of
arrangement is usually from six to  ten years, with the possibility  of renewal for up to twenty
years.
Concession contract:  This arrangment goes a step further than the lease contract in
that the concessionary must also finance investment costs.  Compensation is through tariff
revenues, part of which may have to be turned over to  the public authority if it has
contributed to capital costs.  Such contracts are usually for a longer period (maximum  fifteen
years) than service, management, or lease contracts to allow the firm to  recoup capital costs.28  Anner 2
Summary of  Key Legal Documents
Governing the Guinea Water Supply Sector'
Enterprise  Contract  Bctween  the  State  of  Guinea  and  SONEG
This  document  specit'ics  SONEG's  objectives  and  the  mutual  obligations  of  SONEG
and  thc  state  as its only shareholder  for  a  limited period  of  time.  SONEG  is authorized  to
set  tariffs at  levels that  gradually  will fully cover  operating  costs,  depreciation  and  debt  service,
and will contributc  to  new  investments.  Minimum  tariff  levels for  the  period  1989-1992 are
established.  The  state  assumes  rcsponsibility  for  ensuring  that  the  projected  costs  of
administrative  and  municipal  water  consumption  are  budgeted  and  that  bills  are  paid  as
scheduled.  An  initial  investment  program  is presented.  SONEG  is required  to  submit
annually  a  budget,  four-year  consolidated  financial projections  for  the  sector,  annual
consolidatted accounts  for  the  sector,  and  an  independent  auditor's  report.
Urban  Water  Sector  General  Regulations
A  Cahier des  Charges attached  to  SONEG's  enterprise  contract  lists the  permanent
regulations  governing  scctor  planning.  management,  and  financing.  The  respective  roles  of the
oversight  ministry and  of' SONEG  are  defined.  The  oversight  ministry is charged  with
establ.shing  long-term  objectives  for water  service; approving  and  monitoring  SONEG's
invcstment  program  and  program  contract;  approving  decisions  of SONEG's  Board  of  Directors
regardling tariffs,  loIng-  and  medium-tcrm  loans,  lease  contracts,  etc.;  and  monitoring  SONEG's
performance.  SONEG  is charged  with  identifying urban  water  supply needs  in  light of  the
long-tcrm  objcctivcs;  carrying out  feasibiity studies;  preparing  annually  a  three-year  investment
program;  proposing  annually  a  three-year  program  contract;  preparing  ten-year  financial
forecasts;  preparing  annlual financial and  technical  reports;  and  maintaining  an  accurate  and  up-
to-date  map  of the  system.  SONEG's  assets  and  sources  of  income  are  identified.  It  is
established  that  tariffs  should  cover  the  full cost  of water  supply including  operations,
depreciation,  and  debt  service.  and  that,  in  the  event  tariffs are  inadequate  to  cover  costs,  the
state  will subsidize  SONEG  in  the  amount  of  the  shortfall.  SONEG  is required  to  depreciate
the  value  of its assets  in  its annual  accounts,  maintain  and  replace  equipment  and  installations
as needed,  and  ensure  that  the  lease  contractor  respects  its maintenance  obligations.
SONEG's  exclusive responsibility  for  the  execution  or  subcontracting  of all  urban  water  supply
projects,  and  the  subcontracting  of  urban  water  supply operations,  is affirmed.  Applicable
procurement  regulations  are  identified.
SONEG's  Statutes
This  document  specifies  SONEG's  organization,  administrative  and  financial  procedures.
It  outlines  the  powers  and  responsibilities  of the  Board  of Directors,  the  General  Director,
and  the  role  of the  Secretariat  of State  for  Energy,  under  the  tutelage  of  which SONEG  has
becn  placed.
1.  All of these documents are in French.  They are available in the Project Filc in the Africa Information
Center.29  .*Annex  2
SEEG Shareholders' Agreement
The two shareholders--the Republic of Guinea and a consortium of' two Frcnch
companies, the Soci&t6  d'Am6nagement Urbain  et Rural (SAUR) and the Compagnie Geicrailc
des  Eaux  (CGE)--agree  to  create  SEEG.  The  Republic  of  Guinea  owns 49  percent  of' the
stock  and  the  French  partner,  the  foreign  investor-managcr  (FIM),  51  perccnt.  The  amounts
and  schedule  of capital  contributions  are  specified.  The  govcrnment  guarantees  to  the
company  the  right  to  conduct  business,  hire  and  fire,  and  obtain  visas  for  expatriate  personnel,
subject  to  the  existing  laws of Guinea.  The  governmcnt  also  guarantces  certain  privilcges
regarding  monetary  exchanges  and  transfers.  The  company  agrccs  to  hirc  Guinean  nationals
for  unskilled  positions  and,  to  the  extent  possible,  for  other  positions,  to  train  Guincans  to
eventually  take  over  all  positions  of  responsibility,  and  to  use  Guinean  products  and  services  to
the  extent  that  thb'  are  competitive.
Lease  Contract  Between  SONEG  and  SEEG
SEEG  is assigned  responsibilitv  for operating  the  water  supply  scrvices in  ten  urban
areas  with  the  possibility of being  assigned  additional  systems  as they  are  built.  SEEG's  tax
and  tariff  liabilities  and  exceptions  are  established  for  a  period  ot' six years.  Thc  date  and
duration  of  the  contract  are specified,  as  is a  schedule  for  the  transfer  ol' the  urban  water
systems once  the  contract  takes  effect.  SEEG's  right  to  open  bank  accounts  and  transfer
currency  freely  is ensured.
Detailed  Operating  Specifications
The  Cahier des  Charges d'Exploitation  is a  detailed  attachment  to  the  Lease  Contract.
The main  document  is 42  pages  long  and  contains  76  articles  which  detail  performance
standards,  maintenance  responsibilities,  and  procedures  for  adjusting  the  lease-contractor  ratc.
A  number  of  annexes  are  attached:  demand  projections  (large  variations  from which  would
serve  as a basis  for  renegotiating  the  LCR);  tables  of  agreed  connection  charges  and  chargcs
for  rehabilitation  of connections;  rules governing  water  service accounts,  detailed  inventory  of
each  installation  turned  over  to  SEEG  (to  be  attached  each  time  an  installation  is turned  over
and  revised  to  reflect  rehabilitation  work);  and  technical  documents  for  the  installations.
SEEG's  Statutes
This  document  specifies  the  division of  stock of  SEEG  between  the  two sharcholders.
rules  governing  transfers  of  stock,  the  composition  of  the  Board  of  Directors,  rules  governing
selection  of the  chairman  of  the  Board  and  the  director  gLneral,  the  responsibilities  and
powers  of  the  Board  and  of the  director  general,  and  the  percentage  majority  required  for
passing  certain  important  decisions  by the  Board  of  Directors.
Management  Contract  Between  the  FIM  and  SEEG
The  foreign  investor-manager  is engaged  to  provide  management  and  technical  services
to  SEEG  for  the  rehabilitation  program,  operations,  logistics, financial  managemcnt,  staff
training,  and  other  administrative  services  as needed.  The  services to  be  provided  include  the
provision of  information,  analysis, and  advice from  the  FIM's  headquarters,  short-term30  Annex  2
consultancies,  recruitment of expatriate personnel for positions that cannot be filled by
Guineans, and procurement of equipment and parts.  Remuneration of the FIM for these
services is set at 2 percent of the lease-contractor rate  (SEEG's portion of collected tariff
revenues and connection charges).  In addition, SEEG must pay 5 percent of the cost of
procured goods, any expenses that the FIM incurs outside its headquarters for recruitment, and
the expenses of FIM personnel on short-term missions to Guinea.PRE  Wodking  Paper  Series
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